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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence on merger gains in the 
financial services industry. This is done by means of an “event study” of the Nordic market. 
The data sample underlying the analysis consists of 28 Nordic mergers in the period between 
1999 and January 2006. The empirical analysis in this paper calculates excess returns of 
financial institutions around the merger announcement date within a 30-days event window.  
The findings support previous European research of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) who 
find support for the synergy hypothesis of M&A activity meaning that bidders and the 
combined entity experience positive cumulated abnormal returns, whereas the bidder’s 
CAAR are not significantly different from zero. In the empirical analysis, significant 
deviating merger gains between domestic vs. international, cross product vs. focused and 
shares- vs. cash-payment could not be found. This might be caused by the small data sample 
underlying the analysis. Further research is necessary to determine the success/failure of 
different merger drivers. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence on merger gains in the 
financial services industry. This is done by means of an “event study” of the Nordic market. 
The data sample underlying the analysis consists of 28 Nordic mergers in the period between 
1999 and January 2006. Beyond the investigation of whether Nordic banking mergers follow 
the empire building or synergy hypothesis, the impact of cross-segment deals, cross-border 
deals and the medium of payment will be of major concern to the study. 
The paper is organized as follows: The rest of chapter 1 presents background information on 
the financial services industry and motivates the study; chapter 2 highlights economical and 
financial theory and previously undertaken research in the field; chapter 3 describes the data 
collection process; chapter 4 outlines the methodology used in the empirical analysis; its 
results are then pinpointed and discussed in chapter 5; finally, chapter 6 summarises the 
findings and tries to give an outline for further research in the field. 
1.1 Recent Consolidation in the Financial Services Industry 
The amount of M&A activity in the financial sector has been increasing rapidly in the last 
decade in most parts of the world. Becher (2000) states that US bank mergers have more 
than doubled in the 1990s.  During this period, Europe also experienced a marked increase in 
merger activity in the financial services industry. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) point out 
that that the number of yearly European M&A deals increased from 15 in 1985 to 50-90 
between 1986 and 1994. Beitel et al. (2004) explain the reduction of European commercial 
banks from 12.670 in 1985 to 8.395 in 1999 mainly by means of mergers between banks. 
Berger et al. (2004) provide a graphical illustration of M&A development in the US and 
Europe.1
                                                 
1 Berger et al. (2004) take the data for the graphs from Thomson Financial Securities Data database on Worldwide Mergers 
and Acquisitions 
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Figure 1: M&As of US Financial Institutions 
Figures 1 shows that the US experienced tremendous growth in domestic mergers. An export 
US M&A is a purchase of a non-US firm by a US firm. The opposite is valid for an import 
M&A. Domestic mergers are apparently the dominating merger type although there was also 
a strong increase in cross-border M&A. 
Figure 2: M&As of EU Financial Institutions 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of M&A activity within the EU. Mergers in which both 
parties involved are from EU member states are considered as domestic mergers. The graph 
for the EU looks similar to the one with US data. 
An interesting feature of both graphs is the drop in M&A activity around the year 2000. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) explain the stylised fact that M&As occur in merger waves. 
The authors explain the drop around the year 2000 as signalling the end of the fifth merger 
 10 
wave, which was caused by a collapse of consumer confidence and overcapacity of 
traditional markets. 
According to Øverli (2003), industry concentration is highest in the Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries among the members of the EOS. Sweden and Finland have the highest 
Herfindahl-index2 for market concentration. The author argues that internationalisation in 
the financial services industry takes place mainly through M&A and to a smaller extent 
through the establishment of foreign branches. High market concentration in Scandinavia 
can be interpreted as a sign of strong M&A activity in these countries during the last decade.  
Recent history of the Nordic financial institutions market might explain the rather high 
market concentration. In addition, it is crucial to be aware of the most important incidents 
when studying this market. Lindblom (2001) provides a brief summary of the most 
important incidents.  
Following the deregulation of the banking market in the 1980s, Scandinavian central banks 
enhanced the amount of money circulating in the economy. Banks had high amounts of 
money and granted high credits to market participants without proper risk management 
systems. Naturally, banks experienced high credit losses due to customers not being able to 
pay back debts. This led to a profound financial crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. 
The banking crisis led to a change in the industry structure. Banks that were more efficient 
acquired less efficient ones. Thus, a period of consolidation and M&As followed the 
banking crisis. This consolidation continues to this day as there is still a vast amount of 
merger activity in the Nordic market. 
Consequently, the observation of wealth effects after the announcement of a planned M&A 
is a contemporary topic especially in the Nordic market. Moreover, as shown above, 
virtually all industrialized countries have experienced a period of consolidation in the 
financial services industry. This global phenomenon provokes two questions: 
• What triggers accelerating industry consolidation? 
• What are the gains/outcomes of the consolidation? 
                                                 
2 According to Verdier (2003; 145), the Herfindahl-index is a “measure of the market share of the top five or ten banks”  
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The next section will briefly discuss the first question, whereas the paper’s main intention is 
to enhance insight into M&A gains in the financial services industry. 
1.2 Triggers for the recent M&A Wave 
Section 1.1 described the rapidly increasing amount of banking mergers. Berger et al. (1999) 
provide several concurring reasons for the consolidation wave in the 1990s.  
• Technological progress: Scale economies may have increased due to technological 
progress. New products, i.e. risk management tools, can be provided more efficiently 
by big firms than by others. New delivery services for depositor services such as 
ATMs may exhibit potential for scale economies. 
• Improvements in financial conditions: Corporate finance theory argues that a high 
amount of “free cash-flow” increases M&A activities as more NPV-increasing 
investments can be undertaken. In the US, bank profits broke records in the 1990s. 
• Accumulation of excess capacity or financial distress: Some industry participants 
might operate below the efficiency frontier, meaning that excess capacity may be 
removed by, i.e., substituting management. Similarly, management is tempted to 
undertake risky M&As in times of financial distress in an attempt to ensure its 
working places. 
• International consolidation of markets: The globalization of markets reinforced 
internationalisation of the financial markets, too. International trade creates cross-
border capital flow. Thus, a need for currency securitisation, international deposit 
and loans is created.  
• Deregulation: Different acts in the EU and the US relaxed banking restrictions. Thus, 
cross-border, cross-segment deals became a valuable option for financial institutions. 
It increased their reach and opened up for further efficiency gains. 
This list provides an insight into reasons for the accelerating financial consolidation taking 
place in the end of the last century. However, it just outlines the underlying reasons. It does 
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not provide any information on the economical justification of M&As. This paper intends to 
shed further light on merger gains and their origin.  
1.3 Motivation for the study 
Another introductory consideration is the choice of the regional scope in the analysis. As 
mentioned above, the paper investigates the Nordic market. The term Nordic as used in this 
paper includes Scandinavia, Iceland, Finland and the three Baltic countries.  
Iceland has a very small home market. Thus, big local financial conglomerates are forced to 
expand their business activities abroad in order to grow. Many Icelandic companies have 
recently invested in the Scandinavian countries. This fact in addition to its historical and 
cultural ties, serve as justifications for Iceland’s inclusion in the data sample. 
The Baltic countries comprise Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These countries have become 
major investment opportunities for Scandinavian financial institutions during the last several 
years.3  This was reinforced following the integration of the Baltic countries into the 
European Union.  Joining the EU, they now had to stabilise their economical situations and 
reduce trade restrictions. As a consequence, FDI into these countries became more attractive. 
Ongoing investment activities of Scandinavian financial market participants in the Baltic 
countries made it natural to include these countries into the sample as well. 
According to Houston et al. (2001), most research on bank mergers is based on one of two 
approaches. The first approach focuses on changes in accounting numbers and ratios before 
and after the merger. Beitel et al. (2004) call this approach performance studies because 
performance measures are compared. In this way, efficiency gains extracted from the merger 
can be determined. One major pitfall of this methodology is the difficulty in measuring 
efficiency gains reliably as these do not occur at once when the merger is established. 
The second approach is the “event study” approach, which is applied in this paper. Given the 
requirement of efficient markets4, new information is incorporated immediately in the 
                                                 
3 See website of the Index of Economic Freedom for Estonia 2006 
4 For an explanation of market efficiency theory see chapter 2.6 
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current stock price. As such, it is possible to measure shareholders’ expectations of future 
cash flows to the company when the merger is announced. A drawback of this methodology 
is that financing information is mixed with merger information. It is therefore difficult to 
analyse the effects separately. Moreover, in a consolidation wave, mergers are anticipated 
and the stock price reaction does not reflect the true value of the merger. In spite of its 
drawbacks, this method is widely accepted and used in banking merger research. 
To the author’s knowledge, there has been no research on the Nordic market undertaken 
using the event study methodology. This is probably because Nordic financial institutions 
have seldom been publicly traded (Vander Vennet, 1998).  
Generally, it is surprising that such few studies on the consolidation of the Nordic financial 
services industry have been undertaken recently. “Universal banking”5 is most widespread 
in the Benelux countries and in the Scandinavian countries as the mergers between i.e. DnB 
and Gjensidige as well as between Storebrand and Finansbanken illustrate. In addition, this 
region is culturally assimilated, which might result in bigger gains stemming from 
international mergers within the region. Thus, the investigation of the Nordic market makes 
a valuable contribution to research in the field of banking M&As. 
In summary, this paper’s intent is to contribute to research in the field of M&A by 
undertaking an event study of merger announcement reactions in the Nordic financial 
services market. As a result of this undertaking, the gap pertaining to research on the Nordic 
market shall be reduced. 
                                                 
5 For an in depth discussion of universal banking see chapter 2.4 
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2. Theoretical framework 
This paper intends to investigate the Nordic financial services market by means of an event 
study of stock price reactions to merger announcements between a Nordic bank and another 
market participant in the Nordic financial services industry. In addition, this paper tries to 
contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding reasons for value creation or destruction of 
M&As within the financial services industry. In particular, the variables cross-border vs. 
domestic, focused vs. product diversifying and cash vs. stock payments will be examined.  
In the following section, an economical consideration of these variables in relation to merger 
announcement effects will be undertaken. The purpose of this exercise is to develop the 
background to formulate hypotheses about the expected behaviour of these variables in the 
empirical analysis.  
2.1 Basic economical background for merger gains 
To start out a theoretical discussion on wealth effects of merger announcements in the 
financial services industry, it is useful to consider basic financial theory about merger gains 
and losses. Brealey et al. (2006) discuss thoroughly the economical reasons for merger 
success. First, the authors argue that the merged firm needs to be worth more together than 
the separated entities: 
( ) ABBAAB PVPVPVPVGain Δ=+−=  
A positive gain is an economical justification for a merger. However, firm A usually has to 
pay a premium above the present value of firm B in order to convince shareholders of firm B 
to agree on the merger. Thus, merger costs need to be considered: 
 BPVpaidcashCost −=
Costs calculated in this manner constitute a measurement of the distribution of the merger 
gains between the shareholders of company A and B. Finally, the net present value of the 
merger to the acquiring firm A can be determined. The merger should be undertaken if NPV 
is positive. 
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( )BAB PVcashPV
tgainNPV cos= −
−−Δ= 
A positive NPV can be the outcome of the interplay of different merger benefits. Diaz et al. 
(2004) present a list of value-maximizing reasons for banking mergers. The foremost 
mentioned reason is scale economies. Other reasons constitute “scope economies, market 
power, improvement of management efficiency, decrease of risk through geographic and 
product diversification” (Diaz et al., 2004; 380). The impact of some of these reasons for 
merger gains will be tested in the empirical analysis of this paper. Accordingly, a theoretical 
discussion of these will follow in the next chapters. 
In practise, mergers sometimes also take place without a positive NPV. Hence, such deals 
are undertaken without any measurable, economical benefit. Diaz et al. (2004) call merger 
motives, which cause the acceptance of such deals, non value-maximizing. Management and 
government incentives play a crucial role in this category of merger reasons.  
Management incentives often deviate from shareholders incentives as managers earn higher 
salaries with increasing firm size. Managers are therefore tempted to acquire other 
companies just to grow faster and bigger. This phenomenon is referred to as agency problem 
(Berger et al., 1999).  
Governments have direct influence on consolidation in the financial market through 
legislation and approval/disapproval of M&As. This is because financial stability is of public 
interest. Usually, governments are concerned about a too high market concentration. In case 
of financial distress of one of the biggest industry players, financial stability is endangered 
and governments are pressured to intervene. Hence, the respective bank in trouble is “too big 
to fail” (Berger et al., 1999; 147). Apparently, managers can reduce insolvency risk by 
growing in order to be classified too big to fail.  
These merger motives are solely of strategic and political nature but nonetheless prevalent in 
the financial services industry. As such, the discussion whether mergers are economically 
justified will be of major concern in the research of this paper.   
Finally, the paper investigates the role of medium of payment in Nordic banking mergers. 
The medium of payment seems to be crucial to the consideration of targets about whether to 
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accept a takeover bid. By evaluating the medium of payment, the paper progresses to an 
investigation of the second issue emphasized by Brealey et al. (2006), namely the 
distribution of merger gains between bidder and target shareholders. 
2.2 Deviating merger announcement results between the 
US and Europe 
Several studies find deviating results between US and non-US mergers (Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia, 2000; De Long, 2003). First, this section highlights these deviations between the 
two regions. Subsequently, economic theory unfolds potential underlying reasons for the 
different behaviours of the two markets.  
Becher (2000) finds for a sample of 558 US bank mergers during the period 1980-1997 a 
cumulative abnormal return of 22.6% on a 30 days event window basis and 17.1% for an 11 
days event window for the targets. The bidders end up with a cumulative abnormal return of 
–0.1% on a 30 days event window and –1.08% on an 11 days event window. Becher (2000) 
states that bidders’ return on an 11 days event window is significantly deviating from zero, 
meaning that bidders in US banking mergers experienced a negative return from the merger 
activity. 
Madura and Wiant (1994) criticise this approach of focusing on short-term abnormal returns. 
Instead, the authors try to find long-term valuation effects of US bank acquisitions. Their 
sample data covers a 36-month-period. Results show a significantly negative CAR from the 
second month onwards. Hence, M&A gains in the US are doubtful even in the long-term. 
However, research on European bank mergers and acquisitions has not yet been undertaken 
intensively. This is mainly due to the “huge methodological difficulties of studying the 
fragmented European banking market” (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; 832).Vander 
Vennet (1998) links the rare occurrence of research about European banking mergers to the 
fact that European banks are seldom publicly traded. 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) claim their European study of bank merger wealth effects to 
be one of the first ones. In their research, they find a significantly positive CAR for the 
bidders and targets combined for all event windows when using a general market index as 
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benchmark. This finding does not hold for a bank sector index as benchmark as merger 
announcements usually tend to influence the entire bank sector’s stock prices, especially in a 
small economy. This, in turn, reduces bidders’ excess return. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) argue that the finding of a positive CAR opposes most US research, which usually 
states no wealth effect to the combined entity. DeLong (2003) estimates the CAR for the 
bidder as being higher for non US-mergers than for the US control group, while returns on 
the targets are lower than for the non-US merger. 
These apparently deviating results between US and European research make it necessary to 
further investigate into regional differences of merger announcements’ wealth effect. 
Scholtens and De Wit (2004) distinguish between two basic theoretical approaches to 
explain differences in merger announcements gains. 
The first approach is based on finance theory. It considers the degree of market segmentation 
vs. integration. In case of similar results between US and European merger announcements, 
economic literature suggests a globally integrated financial market, whereas deviating results 
indicate segmented stock markets between the two regions. The authors warn not to see 
market integration vs. segmentation as a binary variable. This is due to the apparent 
existence of a certain degree of integration. 
Scholtens and De Wit (2004) identify the degree of market development as the second 
economical reasoning to explain merger announcements observations. The theory goes back 
to Fama (1991). It expects new information to have higher effects on stock prices in highly 
developed financial markets than in less developed ones.  
According to Scholten and De Wit (2004), this opens up for the question of orientation of 
the respective financial market. Orientation of a financial market is dependent on the 
preferred source of financing of the members of a financial market. In case of a well-
developed stock exchange, the issue of securities is an accepted alternative to bank lending. 
Thus, countries with a strong and active stock market as a financing source, i.e. the US, are 
considered as market-based systems, while countries, which primarily rely on bank lending 
for financing purposes, are called bank-based systems, i.e. Germany.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) try to estimate about 150 countries’ financial structure in 
order to determine whether it is market-based or bank-based. One would expect quite similar 
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results for the Nordic countries, as geography, culture and economical development are 
assumed quite similar. However, the authors perceive Finland and Norway as rather bank-
based, whereas Denmark and especially Sweden are ranked as market-based. This leads to 
the conclusion that financial structure between the Nordic countries varies from country to 
country in spite of their geographical proximity. Unfortunately, the article provides no 
information on the Baltic countries. Iceland is just partly considered in the article. However, 
the information given indicates a strong bank-based system.  
De Long (2003) distinguishes between market-based and bank-based systems in her analysis 
of bank mergers. She finds that US bank mergers and market-based non US-mergers exhibit 
much more similar announcement effects than US bank mergers and non-US bank-based 
mergers. This means that higher abnormal returns to non-US acquirers compared to their US 
counterparts disappear in the existence of the same financial market system. Given the 
different financial system heritage within the Nordic countries, De Long’s results imply the 
existence of different wealth reactions to merger announcements between the Nordic 
countries.  
A drawback to the categorizations market- vs. bank-based systems is the existence of a 
gradual scale, meaning that none of the countries are purely market- nor bank-based 
(Scholten and de Wit, 2004). Thus, results might be difficult to interpret, especially because 
Norway, Finland and Denmark are not ranked among the most extreme countries on the 
bank- vs. market-based scale.  
According to Scholten and De Wit (2004), there is a link between research investigating the 
market development theory and research investigating the drivers of mergers and 
acquisitions. Beitel et al. (2004) criticise European M&A research arguing that it fails to 
provide reasons for value creation or destruction of bank mergers. Consequently, the authors 
test 13 drivers developed from prior US-research for excessive returns to the shareholders in 
an attempt to explain bank merger success.  
Drivers identified by Beitel et al. (2004) include the method of payments, the geographic 
focus of the merger and the product/activity focus of the merger. These drivers will also be 
examined in this paper. A theoretical background to these will be presented in detail in the 
following chapters. 
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2.3 Bidder vs. target returns 
Earlier empirical results in the US and Europe correspond with each other in the unequal 
distribution of merger gains between the bidder and the target. In the following, reasoning 
for this phenomenon will be developed.   
According to Brealey et al. (2006), sellers usually end up better off than buyers. The authors 
define two reasons for this phenomenon. First, the different size of the bidder and the target 
plays a major role in imbalances of merger gain distribution. The bidder is often much 
bigger than the target, leading to significantly higher abnormal returns to the target when the 
merger gains are equally shared in absolute dollar values. The second and more important 
reason occurs in cases in which different companies are bidding for the same target. The 
competitors are bidding up the price, leaving most of the merger gains to the stockholders of 
the target. Hence, it is rather straightforward to argue that the target company experiences a 
positive wealth effect in any case. 
Roll (1986) discusses the fact that bidders are usually overpaying their targets. Given strong 
market efficiency, the target’s true value is given through the stock price. Tender offers 
exceeding the market value of the company are consequently made on the management’s 
hubris. Considering cases in which a rival to the bidder exists, they will bid up the price to a 
point, at which the winner is paying more than the target is worth even though management 
might still believe in the opportunity to extract synergies and to improve efficiency.  
Roll (1986) defines this phenomenon as hubris hypothesis. It says that the bidder 
overestimates the value or the potential of synergies and, thus, pays too much. Consequently, 
the bidder’s wealth effect will be negative, while the target experiences a strong raise in its 
stock price. The combined gain of the merger is about zero. Copeland et al. (2005; 764) 
describe this pattern with an expression actually known from initial public offerings (IPO’s): 
“the winner’s curse”. The winner of a bidding war is actually loosing due to the high 
expenses of a merger.  
Becher (2000) undertakes an empirical analysis in order to test the hubris or empire building 
hypothesis vs. the synergies hypothesis in the banking industry. In order to complement the 
two extreme views, he introduces a third, the hubris and synergies hypothesis. In each of the 
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three hypotheses, he outlines the payoff structure that each hypothesis gives to the bidder, 
the target and the combined firm, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3: Becher (2000); Hubris vs. synergy hypothesis 
Figure 1 shows these outcomes. The CAR to the target is positive in any case. However, 
while the bidder’s return is negative for the hubris and the combined hubris and synergy 
hypothesis, it is non-negative in the case of the synergy hypothesis. Finally, the combined 
firm gains from the merger apart from the hubris hypothesis.  
Becher (2000) finds in his analysis of US banks support for the combined hubris and 
synergies hypothesis. Interestingly, the European study of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
is in favour of the synergy hypothesis, which means that M&A activity in the financial 
services industry is justified economically from a bidder point of view.  
The Nordic sample used in the empirical analysis of this paper is assumed to follow the 
European pattern. The explanation for this will mainly be developed throughout the next 
sections. 
2.4 Cross-sector mergers 
A discussion of cross-sector mergers can be deduced from the basic incentives for M&As. 
As discussed above, Becher (2000) distinguishes between the synergies and hubris 
hypothesis. Mergers are justified when the synergies hypothesis holds. Thus, synergies in 
form of, i.e., cost efficiencies or enhanced management efficiency can be achieved by 
merging the two entities. This section discusses more thoroughly the different forms for 
efficiency gains. 
Brealey et al. (2006; 871) distinguishes between horizontal and vertical mergers. 
Conglomerates are a third category. Horizontal mergers are between companies within the 
same line of business, whereas there is no connection between companies building a 
conglomerate. Thus, horizontal mergers usually provide opportunities for synergies in the 
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form of economies of scale or scope. A vertical merger takes place between companies at a 
different stage of production. This kind of merger plays a negligible role in the financial 
services industry due to the lack of a traditional supply chain. While conglomerate building 
was quite popular in the 1960s and 1970s, focused mergers have become more central to 
acquirers.     
Similarly, Berger et al. (1999; 144-146) distinguish between “value-maximization” and 
“non-value maximization motives”. He sub-divides value-maximizing motives in two further 
categories.  
Companies gain value through consolidation in two ways, namely either by enhancing 
market power or by efficiency gains. Market power can be enhanced by means of in-market 
M&A, meaning that two market participants, which used to be competitors, merge. Thus, 
market concentration increases and the newly merged conglomerate might reinforce its 
market power in a way that its ability to influence retail prices increases. 
Research (Vander Vennet, 1997; Focarelli et al., 1998) finds stronger evidence for M&A’s 
motivated by efficiency gains in European transactions. Berger et al. (1999; 157) describe 
efficiency gains as “made by changing input or output quantities in ways that reduce costs, 
increase revenues, and/or reduce risks to increase value for a given set of prices.” This 
might be due to a variety of reasons, amongst these scale, scope and product mix 
efficiencies. 
Apart from the static measurements of efficiency gains, Berger et al. (1999) emphasize the 
potential for X-efficiencies. This is a dynamic efficiency analysis and determines “how much 
closer to or further from the optimal point on the best-practice efficient frontier these firms 
have moved” (Berger et al., 1999; 162). The authors mention a potential 20% increase in 
efficiency ex ante. However, they fail to prove the estimated efficiency gains potential 
empirically. Because a different approach is used to measure X-efficiency (cost- or profit-
function analysis) compared to stock announcement effects, X-efficiency will not be 
investigated in more depth in this paper. 
Boot (2003) presents a list of sources for economies of scale and scope in the financial 
services industry: 
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• Information-related economies: Information-related economies of scale comprise 
economies, which are achieved by a more efficient use of databases and other 
technological aids. Scale economies can be achieved by developing an efficient 
distribution system, whereas scope economies mainly encompass all efficiency gains 
created by the reuse of already generated customer and product information. 
• Reputation and brand name marketing: Scope economies can be extracted by the 
joint marketing effect to customers. The financial services industry sells more and 
more products that are heavily dependent on the firm’s reputation. 
• Financial innovation: Economies related to financial innovation are two-sided. On 
the one hand, it is argued that larger organizations innovate less due to complex 
structures and bureaucracy. On the other hand, economies of scale contribute to a 
competitive advantage due to the potential to sell the innovation to a broader 
customer base. This is especially crucial as competitors are usually able to imitate 
financial innovations easily. 
• Diversification: Many financial products are close substitutes. By selling these 
products within the same organization, it is possible to extract economies of scope by 
diversification. However, this argument is debated heavily in corporate finance 
theory. Diversification is often mentioned as a reason for M&A. In contrast, it is as 
often stated that there is no rationale behind M&A activities as a means for risk 
diversification. Investors do not pay extra for something that they usually do more 
efficiently themselves – diversifying their portfolio (Brealey et al., 2006). Advocates 
of diversification effects argue that through M&A activities, capital is allocated 
internally to profitable projects, which would have to be raised externally at higher 
cost. However, it is also possible to destroy value by allocating capital to 
unprofitable investments.  
The gains from banks merging with non-banking financial services companies such as 
insurances or investment banking companies can be explained by scope economies. Diaz et 
al. (2004; 380) address the economical reasoning behind scope economies in detail: “Scope 
economies make it possible to reduce the cost per unit due to synergies derived from 
providing several services inside the same entity.” This means that, i.e., providing insurance 
products in banks might lead to lower costs per sold product. The authors argue that scope 
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economies can be realised by M&A. Interestingly, Cavallo and Rossi (2001) find that the 
realisation of scope economies is more common in European M&As. They attribute this to 
Europe’s prevalent universal banking principle. Universal banks are banks selling non-
banking products in addition to traditional banking products. 
US legislation traditionally had strict restrictions on banking competition. Commercial banks 
were prohibited to merge with investment banks since 1933 and with insurance companies 
since 1954. Just recently the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act from November 1999 began to 
loosen the tight regulations for universal banking in the US (De Long, 2003).  
In contrast to the US, European legislation is less restrictive in regards to universal banking. 
The Second Banking Co-ordination Directive of 1989 established universal banking as a 
common standard in the European Union (Berger et al., 2004). Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) consider universal banking as a European banking characteristic. Going further, the 
authors state that this less restrictive environment opens up for product expansion as well as 
cross-selling. The various opportunities of synergies can be illustrated by looking at the 
company “Allianz”, Germany’s biggest insurance company. It is currently planning to install 
in its branches 1000 ATM-machines belonging to its daughter company, Dresdner Bank, 
within the next three years.6 Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) claim to be the first ones 
including cross product deals in their data sample. Thus, it stands to reason that universal 
banking might be one of the major explanations for the more beneficial European results. 
Verdier (2003; 213) discusses the term “banc assurance – the distribution of insurance 
products by banks”. He distinguishes three different degrees of banc assurance, the highest 
being a “full-fledged merger”. According to the author, this level is most prevalent in the 
Nordic and Benelux countries. This is yet another justification to undertake this study on the 
Nordic financial services industry. It is interesting to see whether this high degree of banc 
assurance leads to higher announcement effects. 
In addition, Diaz et al. (2004) argue that M&As between a bank and a non-bank financial 
services industry company can reduce risk to the merged company due to product 
diversification effects. This is because selling a variety of different products from within one 
                                                 
6See Handelsblatt, Allianz will bei Bankdiensten helfen; Retrieved: January 28, 2006; 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/pshb?fn=tt&sfn=go&id=1180516
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company can reduce “credit entity risk”. However, the authors state that this effect is 
discussed controversially. This is because the effect can be outweighed by misbehaviour of 
management, which is tempted to run a series of risky projects. This, in turn, increases 
systematic risk and bankruptcy costs. Allen and Jagtiani (2000; 485) conclude that “potential 
gains from synergies and demand effects must be powerful enough to overcome the 
disadvantages of increased systemic risk exposure.” Finally, Diaz et al. (2004) argue that not 
just bank specific risk rises, but also the entire financial system’s risk. This is due to a lower 
number of entities in the industry and thus, higher risk of financial instability because of one 
weak market participant in the industry. 
Results of empirical studies about economies of scale and scope in the financial services 
industry seem inconclusive. Berger et al. (1999) mention in their review of different research 
undertaken in the field that the costs function of the financial services industry is U-shaped. 
This means that just small banks reveal a potential for efficiency gains, whereas medium-
sized and large ones have no scale economies. Altogether, cost reduction is just about 5%. 
The authors find similar results for the measurement of economies of scope. Difficulties 
determining efficiency gains arise from different variables affecting merger gains, i.e. the 
reasons for market concentration and scale economies might apply at the same time. In this 
case, it is almost impossible to measure to which extent scale economies are the underlying 
source for gains and to which extent market concentration (Boot; 2003). Consequently, the 
author suggests putting more emphasis on the type of merger. It seems as if “mergers with 
both a geographic and an activity focus are most value enhancing” (Boot, 2003; 54)7. 
Newer contributions find a somewhat higher potential for cost efficiency gains in the 1990s. 
According to Berger et al. (1999), this possibly reflects a higher potential for economies of 
scale and scope due to technological development in this decade. Hughes et al. (2001) find 
evidence for economies of scale when adjusting bank production models for capital structure 
and risk taking. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to measure economies of scale and scope.  
Cavallo and Rossi (2001) list a number of studies, which reach ambiguous conclusions about 
the existence of economies and diseconomies of scale and scope. Thus, stock market 
                                                 
7 Following Flannery, Mark (1999): Comment on Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor. Journal of Banking and Finance 23, p. 215–
220. 
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reaction to the announcement of a cross-sector merger is assumed not to give a significantly 
higher abnormal return than an in-market merger. However, given the overall success of 
M&As in a European setting, cross-sector mergers are still likely to be profitable. 
2.5 Domestic vs. International mergers 
International trade theory is the cornerstone not just for non-financial economic activity, but 
also for multinational banking. Trade theory goes back to Ricardo’s law of comparative 
advantage. It is based on the assumption that a firm in one country produces a product in its 
home country as long as it has a comparative advantage for the product. It exports the 
product and, in turn, imports products for which it has a comparative disadvantage. The 
price is set by domestic and international demand for the product (Berger et al., 2004). The 
law of comparative advantage implies that international trade most likely occurs between 
dissimilar countries. However, empirical research has shown that this is not always the case. 
As a consequence of the inconsistencies between empirical results and theory, new trade 
theory developed (Berger et al., 2004).  
New trade theory does not require perfect competitive markets. This allows for increasing 
return to scales and heterogeneous consumer preferences and thus, product diversification. 
In addition, it also leaves firms the choice of exporting vs. foreign direct investments (FDI). 
In the case of FDI, firms produce and sell the product in the foreign market.  
Williams (1997) distinguishes between internalization and eclectic theory. The former is 
based on the Coasian assumption that market failure occurs both in the domestic and the 
foreign market. Transaction costs caused by market failure induce firms to acquire 
international companies instead of buying the product or service on the free market. In doing 
so, it is possible to minimize transaction costs as market failure becomes internalized. 
Transferred to banking, transaction costs might constitute information asymmetries such as 
knowledge of the local customer base, which is important to create a lasting client-seller 
relationship. By buying the foreign financial services industry company, the knowledge of 
the local customer base is internalized and the bank can use the gained insight into the 
foreign market more efficiently. 
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Eclectic theory extends internalising theory by adding the requirement of an ownership 
advantage. Eclectic theory is based upon Dunning’s model of multinational organisations. 
According to Dunning (1981), the preference of a FDI over an exporting strategy is based on 
three pillars, which all have to be satisfied independently: ownership advantage, location 
advantage, and internalization advantage. 
An ownership advantage is developed in the company’s home market and is not available in 
the host market before market entrance. By undertaking the FDI, the ownership advantage 
can be transferred to the host market. Usually, ownership advantages are knowledge-based 
as they are easily transferable over big geographical distances (Berger et al., 2004). Williams 
(1997) mentions product differentiation as a typical example for an ownership advantage in 
banking. 
A location advantage induces a firm to move production abroad. Common location 
advantages include “cheap factor prices in the host country; high transportation costs; 
import quotas and tariffs; and better access to the host country customers” (Berger et al., 
2004; 349). An internalization advantage corresponds with the internalization theory. 
According to Williams (1997), this leads to a crucial difference between the theories. In case 
of the internalisation theory, the benefits of an acquisition are measured by total benefits vs. 
total costs, whereas eclectic theory calculates the merger gains by subtracting the 
incumbency costs from the ownership benefits. Williams (1997) concludes that, in his 
opinion, internalisation theory holds to explain internationalization in banking. Hence, he is 
in favour of the internalisation theory and outlines different sub-theories to the 
internalisation theory. 
Berger et al. (2004) test the law of comparative advantages and new trade theory 
empirically. Interestingly, they find evidence for both theories. On the one hand, the authors 
find higher regularity for cross-border M&A between similar8 countries, on the other hand 
they point out the US as having a comparative advantage in the financial services industry9.  
                                                 
8 The authors do not use the word similar. Instead they describe it as follows: geographically close, share common 
languages and legal systems, and have similar sized economies and similar levels of economic development 
9 Comparative advantage is achieved because the US has a high standard of export and import of financial services to and 
from the US. 
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Beyond this study, empirical studies have mainly focused on information costs as well as 
regulation between the countries, in which cross-border mergers have taken place. 
“Additional efficiency barriers may include language, culture, currency and 
regulatory/supervisory structures; and explicit or implicit rules against foreign competitors” 
(Berger et al., 2001; 125). As long as the efficiency barriers are sufficiently low, cross-
border disadvantages may be overcome. Buch and De Long (2004; 2083) empirically test 
three potential sources of information costs: “geographical distance, a common language, 
and a common legal system.” The authors claim that privatization leads to a raise in merger 
activity. This statement is interesting for the data sample used to undertake the research in 
this paper. It is apparent that privatization in the Baltic countries reinforced Scandinavian 
banks’ M&A activity in this area. 
The authors’ findings are as estimated. High information costs, measured in geographical 
distance and a common language, reduce merger incentives. At the same time, banks in less 
developed countries become more interesting to international acquirers when regulation 
becomes more reliable. However, Buch and De Long (2004) also find that the more 
regulated a country is, the less attractive its banks are to international investors. 
Summarising the discussion above, it is not clear whether international mergers will 
outperform domestic mergers. Following internalisation theory reasoning, international 
mergers are more successful than domestic ones if total benefits of internalisation processes 
exceed total information costs. However, this can not be taken for granted as information 
costs are increasing in line with the cultural, geographical and economical distance between 
the countries of a merger. In the case of the Nordic market, in which languages and cultures 
are rather similar, one could expect slightly more successful international mergers compared 
to its domestic counterparts. 
2.6 Cash vs. Stock payment 
As discussed above, an important aspect in financial theory is asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information simply means that the bidder’s management usually has inside 
information, which capital market participants and, subsequently, the target’s management 
do not have. Considering cases in which the bidder’s management constantly insist on 
buying the target by means of an exchange of stocks, the seller is likely to assume that the 
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bidder’s management believes its stock price is currently overvalued. Accordingly, a 
bidder’s cash offer implies the opposite. Thus, the choice of the payment method of a merger 
has a signalling effect to capital market participants and thus, the seller. The signalling effect 
is comparable to announcement effects of changes in dividend payments to stockholders.  
By means of this argumentation, Brealey et al. (2006; 885) try to explain the phenomenon 
discovered by Andrade et al. (2001) that “buying-firms’ share prices generally fall when 
stock-financed mergers are announced”. In contrast, the authors find a slightly positive 
return to the stock price after the announcement of a cash-paid merger. 
Eckbo et al. (1990) extend the asymmetric information hypothesis by stating that the 
asymmetry is two-sided, meaning that target management keeps secret information as well. 
The authors make the distribution of payment gains dependent on overpayment costs vs. lost 
synergy gains. While high bids lead to high overpayment costs, low bids are usually rejected 
and thus lead to lost synergy gains as the deal does not take place. By changing the medium 
of payment from cash to stock, bidders can share the risk of overpayment with the target. 
Subsequently, the authors develop an equilibrium model, which states that two-sided 
information asymmetry leads to an equilibrium mix of cash and shares in a takeover-bid. By 
choosing a certain mix of cash and shares in the offer, the bidder signals its value to the 
target, thereby resolving the information asymmetry. The revealed value is increasing and 
convex in the amount of cash used. Unfortunately, the authors find no conclusive support for 
the model when testing it empirically. It remains unclear whether the model or the empirical 
tests are mistaken.   
Amihud et al. (1990) confirm the asymmetric information hypothesis. Moreover, they 
introduce another hypothesis – the tax effects hypothesis. It says that the owners of the target 
usually prefer to receive payment in stocks. This is because tax payments are due when stock 
gains are redeemed. That means that the target’s stockholders save immediate tax payments 
if the medium is an exchange of common stocks. Hence, bidders usually have to pay a 
premium in cash takeover-bids to compensate target shareholders for the tax penalty (Eckbo 
et al., 1990). 
The question of whether the capital market prefers stock or cash as a medium of payment is 
thus dependent on whether market participants buy into capital market efficiency or not. The 
more efficient the capital market, the faster new information is included in the market value 
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of a stock. The most extreme case, strong-form efficiency, implies that not even publicly 
traded information about a company is already included in the current stock price (Bodie et 
al., 2005). The more information investors, and thus the target’s management, assume to be 
included in the current value of the stock, the better they feel insured against surprises of the 
bidder’s management and the more they will prefer stock payments and, thus, the tax saving 
effect over cash and its safe value. The theory of market efficiency is closely linked to the 
theory about whether a system is bank- vs. market-based. Naturally, a distinct market-based 
system is more likely to accept stock payments than a bank-based one. 
Information asymmetries and tax saving hypotheses effectively cancel each other out. It 
seems therefore reasonable to assume the effect of the method of payment as rather low. 
Unsurprisingly, De Long (2003) finds in her study of 397 US and 41 non-US mergers a 
slightly more positive CAR for mergers with solely cash as payment method. Nonetheless, 
the result is insignificant even at a 10% confidence level. 
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3. Data collection 
Having discussed and reviewed economic theory in the field of financial services 
consolidation and M&As, the empirical research underlying this paper will be presented.  
In this chapter, the method of data collection will be discussed. The data collection process 
consisted of two steps. First, an M&A database had to be found in order to retrieve a 
complete list of mergers between companies in the Nordic market during the last several 
years. Having obtained a list of mergers, the second challenge was to find stock prices for 
both the bidder and target for all deals. Below, both steps of the data collection process are 
described in depth.  
3.1 Data collection from Zephyr 
The necessary data on M&As underlying this research are gathered from the online M&A 
database Zephyr10. The database provides various opportunities to specify the sample 
according to the user’s needs. In the following, the conditions chosen for the analysis in this 
paper will be outlined and justified. 
3.1.1 Geographical scope 
The geographical scope of the data sample is restricted to the Nordic market. The Nordic 
market includes Scandinavia, Iceland and the Baltic countries. Following the categorization 
of the Internet database Zephyr, Finland is included in the Scandinavian countries.  
Iceland plays a prominent role in the sample. This is mainly due to big Icelandic banks 
trying to get a foothold in the Scandinavian market. Kaupthing as well as Islandsbanki were 
quite active in acquiring local Norwegian and Swedish banks. At the same time, Iceland 
experienced consolidation in its domestic financial services industry also. 
                                                 
10 Zephyr is the online M&A database of Bureau van Dyk. The database currently contains more than 350.000 transactions 
worldwide and is updated on a regular basis. The database gives information on rumours, announcements and undertaken 
transactions.    
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The consideration of mergers including Baltic States is limited to Baltic States being the 
target. This is no strict constraint as most mergers involving Baltic countries display the 
Baltic entity as target. However, Baltic countries undergo a period of consolidation, too but 
as domestic mergers within Baltic countries are rather small in size, these were disregarded 
in the data sample.  
3.1.2 Industry classification 
When it comes to the industry classification of the merger participants, both the bidder and 
the target have to fulfil prerequisites in order to qualify the deal for inclusion in the data 
sample. 
First, the bidder has to be a bank. This requirement is necessary in order to narrow the topic 
down to bank mergers. Yet, an exception to this rule is made if a financial conglomerate is 
the acquirer and at least one division of the conglomerate is a bank.  
The second restriction is more general in scope. The target company is required to be a 
financial institution. This includes banks, insurance and investment companies as well as 
general financial service providers. The target’s industry has to be kept general in order to be 
able to examine the effect of universal banking.11
3.1.3 Listing  
The third feature that mergers have to fulfil in order to be included in the sample is 
compulsory listing. This means that both acquirers and targets need to be listed publicly. 
Mergers, in which only one of the involved entities is publicly listed, are eliminated from the 
sample. 
Usually, saving banks do not have listed stock. However, many bigger saving banks issue 
primary capital certificates, which have a similar pattern as common stocks. Thus, such a 
saving bank’s value is measurable on a daily basis even though value changes of these 
certificates are less frequent than of common stocks. Therefore, saving banks issuing 
                                                 
11 See chapter 2.4 about the economics of the universal banking principle 
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primary capital certificates are included in the sample given that the specific merger fulfils 
the other requirements as well. 
Beyond the requirement of public listing, no further condition, linked to the deal size, is 
made. This is because publicly listed companies are assumed to be the biggest players in the 
industry. 
Finally, there is no constraint for the medium of payment. One intention of this paper is to 
measure the differences in wealth effects between stock and cash payment of M&As. If the 
payment method of the deal is unknown, the merger is included in the sample generally, but 
eliminated when evaluating the method of payment. 
3.1.4 Deal type and status 
Accepted deal types are limited to mergers and acquisitions. This means that all recently 
occurring deal types such as “Management buy-outs (MBO)”, “leveraged buy-out (LBO)” or 
“joint ventures” are excluded from the sample. This is because these deal types require 
additional consideration, which would be beyond the scope of this paper. Including these 
forms of deals into the sample without a theoretical foundation would reduce the accuracy 
and reliability of the results as additional factors might come into play. 
Deal status contains information about the stage of the deal. Just pending and completed 
deals are included in the sample. This is because probability that a pending deal will be 
undertaken is assumed high. In contrast, announced or rumoured deals are not sufficient to 
be part of the data sample. In the early stages of a merger announcement, uncertainty about 
whether the deal will take place is high. Hence, the deal is not granted sufficient credibility 
even though the stock market already adjusts to the emerging information. 
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3.1.5 Results from Zephyr 
Having adjusted the research for the above listed conditions, a list of altogether 39 M&As 
was obtained.12 The list wrongly contained two deals, which included Polish targets. These 
were removed from the data sample instantly. 
As for the other deals, it was essential to find data for the stock price around the 
announcement date of the M&A deal. Zephyr provides information on the rumour, 
announcement and completion date of M&As. For some of the deals, Zephyr stated bid 
premium returns for the targets including the date. 
In case of a stated date for a bid premium return, this date was taken as day zero for the 
event study. As for the M&As without an explicit bid premium date, the announcement and 
rumour dates were highlighted as day zero. If rumour and announcement dates deviated, the 
earlier rumour date was accounted for as day zero.  
3.2 Data collection from Datastream 
Having identified the day zero for all deals in the sample, it was possible to find stock price 
information on all companies by means of Datastream, one of the most comprehensive 
databases in terms of equity markets, indices and macro economical time series. In case of 
lacking information on some companies, the websites of local stock exchanges were also 
screened for information.13  
Again, deals were only kept in the data sample if there was stock information available for 
both entities involved in the deal. Otherwise, both entities were removed from the sample. 
After extensive research, the final sample comprised 28 M&A deals. Table 1 displays the 
final list. 
 
                                                 
12 For a complete list of the deals see appendix 1 
13 This is especially valid for the Icelandic stock exchange as Datastream was lacking information on many Icelandic 
companies 
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Acquirer Country Target Country 
Storebrand ASA NO Finansbanken ASA NO 
FöreningsSparbanken AB SE Hansapank AS EE 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SE Bergensbanken ASA NO 
Merita Nordbanken Group SE Nordea Denmark/Unidanmark DK 
SEB AB SE Eesti Ühispank AS EE 
Merita Nordbanken Group SE Christiania Bank/Kreditkasse NO 
Spar Nord Bank A/S DK Aars Bank AS DK 
SEB AB SE Latvijas Unibanka AS LV 
FöreningsSparbanken AB SE Hansapank AS EE 
Danske Bank A/S DK RealDanmark A/S DK 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SE Midtbank A/S DK 
Egnsbank Han Herred A/S DK DAI Holding A/S DK 
SEB AB SE Eesti Ühispank AS EE 
Sydbank A/S DK Egnsbank Fyn AS DK 
Ringkjøbing Landbobank DK Tarm Bank A/S DK 
Sampo Oyi FI Sampo Bank AS EE 
Kaupthing Bank HF IS JP Nordiska AB SE 
Sparekassen Faaborg A/S DK Regional Invest Fyn A/S DK 
Islandsbanki HF IS Sjóvá-Almennar tryggingar HF IS 
DnB Holding ASA NO Nordlansbanken ASA NO 
Danske Bank A/S DK Fokus Bank ASA NO 
DnB Holding ASA NO Gjensidige Nor ASA NO 
Islandsbanki HF IS Kredittbanken ASA NO 
Helgeland Sparebank NO Sparebanken Rana NO 
Islandsbanki HF IS Bolig- og Næringsbanken ASA NO 
FöreningsSparbanken AB SE Hansapank AS EE 
SEB AB SE Privatbanken ASA NO 
DnB NOR Bank ASA NO Nord/LB Latvija IAS LV 
Table 1: Final data sample retrieved from Zephyr and Datastream14
                                                 
14 For a detailed list containing all available information on each deal see appendix 2 
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4. Methodology 
The methodological approach applied in this paper follows Brown and Warner (1985). The 
article forms the cornerstone for most event studies based on daily stock returns. In the 
following sections, the event study methodology will be presented and discussed in detail. 
4.1 Event Window 
The final sample consists of 56 securities and 28 events. Each event has an event day, which 
is the earliest of rumour, announcement and completion date.15 The event day is defined as 
day zero. Stock information is gathered for every single security for altogether 129 days. The 
range lasts from day –104 until day +24. The minus indicates that this date is before the 
event date.  
The entire period is divided into two sub periods. The first period lasts from day T0 = -104 to 
T1 = -6 comprising, and is called the estimation window. As will be discussed below, the 
estimation window is needed to estimate ordinary least squares (OLS). In order to be able to 
calculate the estimates reliably, it is crucial to have an estimation period which is long 
enough. In this paper, the estimation period is 99 days. This does not comply with Brown 
and Warner (1985) who suggest an estimation period of 239 days in their paper. The rather 
small estimation period used in this paper is due to difficulties finding data for some 
securities dating farther into the past. However, the authors specify that a security was only 
included if it was possible to retrieve at least 30 daily returns in the entire period and if no 
return data was missing in the last 20 days. These requirements are fulfilled for all the 
securities in the final sample employed in this study of the Nordic market. Thus, reliability 
of the OLS estimates is assumed.  
The other period, the event window lasts from day T1+1= –5 to day T2 = +24. This leads to an 
event window of 30 days in this study. Event windows of other studies are sometimes 
shorter, i.e. Becher (2000). However, announcement effects in M&As might occur during a 
                                                 
15 By definition, the rumour date is before the announcement and completion date. However, in some of the mergers all 
three dates coincident. 
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longer period, especially when there is a bidding war or the target rejects the initial offer. 
Consequently, in order to catch some of these effects, the event window chosen is somewhat 
longer. Figure 2 illustrates the time line of an event study. 
 
T0 T1 0 T2 
Estimation 
window 
Event window 
 
Figure 4: Time Line of an Event Study 
4.2 Determination of Abnormal Returns 
Excess returns in an event study can be calculated in different ways. According to Brown 
and Warner (1985), one can distinguish the mean adjusted returns, the market adjusted 
returns and the ordinary least squares (OLS) market model. This paper will use the OLS 
market model approach. It seems appropriate to use this model, as it is the only one which 
adjusts the excess returns of each security for market risk. In the following, this matter is 
explained in more detail. 
Excess returns in the OLS market model are calculated as 
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“where iαˆ and are OLS values from the estimation period” (Brown and Warner, 1985; 7). 
The equation adjusts for the security’s value.  can be explained graphically as the slope 
of the security market line. Analytically, is the covariance between security i’s return and 
the market return divided by the variance of the market index (Brealey et al., 2006).  
iβˆ
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Most companies in the financial services industry have a below one. Thus, the stock value 
of the respective security changes less than 1% for a 1% change in the general market index. 
This, in turn, underestimates excess returns if the model in this research would not adjust for 
market risk.
iβˆ
iαˆ is the intercept of the security market line.  
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Rit and Rmt are the daily returns for security i and the general market index on day t, 
respectively. For this research, a general market index is chosen. A banking sector index 
would falsify the results somewhat as an announcement of a banking merger is likely to 
affect the banking sector index significantly, especially under consideration of the rather 
small economies under investigation. The general market index is aligned to the respective 
security’s country of origin. Otherwise, it would be possible that the excess return of a 
Norwegian acquirer is determined with returns from the Swedish market index. 
Abnormal returns are expected to be zero.16 The variance of the abnormal returns for 
security i, calculated in the above described manner, is just valid for a large estimation 
period. This is because “abnormal returns across time periods will become independent 
asymptotically” (Campbell et al., 1997; 160). 
4.3 Aggregation of the abnormal returns 
Having calculated the excess return for every single security for every day during the event 
period, these must be aggregated. “The abnormal return observations must be aggregated in 
order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest […] – through time and across 
securities” (Campbell et al., 1997; 160). The authors assume no correlation across the 
abnormal returns of different securities as long as any possibility of clustering can be 
eliminated. Clustering occurs if events have the same event window. Generally, this is not 
the case in the data sample underlying this paper as each merger announcement takes place 
at a different point in time.  
Dasgupta et al. (1998) provide a detailed description of the two steps needed to aggregate 
excess returns. The notations below follow the authors’ ones. 
  
 
                                                 
( )
( ) ( ) 212212
21
1,
,
2
1
i
TTTT
withARTTCAR
i
T
Tt
iti
εσσ +−=
= ∑
=
16 For a reasoning behind this assumption see section 4.4 
 
 38 
The requirement of a large estimation period is valid for the calculation of this variance as 
well. Finally, average cumulated abnormal returns can be determined by averaging out all 
events in the sample.  
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4.4 Significance Tests 
In order to formulate a null hypothesis in event studies based on the market model, it helps 
to recall one of the basic assumptions of perfect capital markets. In case of a perfect capital 
market, all securities are lying on the security market line as all securities are priced 
correctly. Hence, there are no excess returns in a perfect capital market. This explains why 
the expected value for abnormal returns in the OLS market model in section 4.2 is equal to 
zero. Consequently, the null hypothesis H0 and its alternative hypothesis are trivial to derive:  
H0: ( ) 0, 21 =TTCAAR  
H1: ( ) 0, 21 ≠TTCAAR  
The null hypothesis can be tested using a t-test. The t-test is a significance test and measures 
whether a null hypothesis can be rejected reliably. The t-test can be undertaken with one 
sample or two samples. The one-sample t-test measures the significance of a sample mean in 
relation to a known population mean. In contrast, the two-sample t-test provides information 
about whether two sample means are significantly different from each other. The paper 
makes use of both versions. In the following, the statistical interpretation of the one-sample 
t-test will be clarified. From this, it is easy to extend the reasoning to the two-sample t-test. 
To perform a one-sample t-test, one needs to use the following formula: 
1
0
−=
−=
N
sswhere
s
Xt X
X
μ  
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X constitutes the measured sample mean, Xs is the standard error of the sample. The 
standard error is calculated by dividing the standard deviation17 of the sample with the 
square root of the degrees of freedom.18 0μ , the hypothesized sample mean, against which 
the measured mean shall be tested, is under the above formulated null hypothesis zero.  
The alternative hypothesis can vary. The alternative hypothesis can be formulated in a 
manner that the measured sample mean is higher, lower or unequal to the hypothesized 
sample mean. In case of an unequal alternative hypothesis, a two-tailed t-test has to be 
undertaken as the experienced sample mean can be both higher and lower.  
By testing the sample for the above-mentioned formula, a p-value is calculated. The p-value 
is a measurement for the likelihood that a “more extreme” result is reached given that H0 
holds. Generally, a rejection rule can be applied. If the p-value is smaller than the 
significance levelα 19, H  is rejected. The smaller the p-value becomes in relation to the 
significance level
0
α , the higher the probability that the rejection of the null hypothesis is 
justified.   
Transferred to the study in this paper, the t-test formula looks as follows: 
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The two-sample t-test measures whether two sample means are significantly different from 
each other. In order to do so, the null hypothesis is adjusted to 
H0: ( ) ( ) 0=− YCAARXCAAR  
H1: ( ) ( ) 0≠− YCAARXCAAR  
 
                                                 
17 The standard deviation is unknown and must be estimated from the data sample. Statistically, this distinguishes a t-test 
from a z-test. 
18 The degrees of freedom are used in order to make the result more unbiased. This is because sample scores can be chosen 
freely apart from the last in order to reach the known sample mean. Thus, degrees of freedom are calculated by subtracting 
one from the sample size N. 
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and the t-statistic formula of  
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4.5 Statistical Considerations of the Event Study 
Methodology 
The reliability of event study methodologies has been widely discussed. Several potential 
problems leading to biased results have been identified in literature.  
Campbell et al. (1997) discuss the use of a one-factor model such as the applied market 
model versus multifactor models. The potential gain of multifactor models is a reduction in 
variance. However, the authors state that “gains from employing multifactor models for 
event studies are limited” (Campbell et al., 1997; 156). 
Another potential bias in event studies occurs through clustering of the event window. 
However, as explained in chapter 4.3, clustering is disregarded in this study as merger 
announcements take place at different calendar days.  
Brown and Warner (1985) measure the impact of other issues concerning event studies when 
using daily stock returns. First, the authors discuss the effect of non-normality of daily stock 
returns and excess returns. The authors argue that the influence of this issue is low as returns 
converge to normality with increasing sample size. The assumption of convergence is 
derived from the Central Limit Theorem.   
The second issue concerns non-synchronous trading intervals, meaning that market returns 
and returns from security i are measured in different time periods. These lead to biased OLS 
estimates of  in the market model. The authors find no clear-cut benefit in detecting iβˆ
                                                                                                                                                      
19 Usually, the significance level in scientific research is set at α=0.05. This leads to a 95% confidence interval. 
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abnormal performance from other models than the OLS. Thus, the OLS model is assumed to 
provide sufficient results. Moreover, market returns and security returns are measured at the 
same time in this study. 
 A final consideration is the choice of the right variance estimator. Non-synchronous trading 
might lead to serial dependence of excess returns. The authors show that incorporation of 
serial dependence improves results only marginally. Moreover, an increase of variance 
during the event window can alter the results of an event study. In this area, further research 
is still required. 
To summarise, Brown and Warner (1985) reach the conclusion that an event study using the 
market model is a good model to estimate abnormal return. The use of daily stock returns 
usually causes few difficulties in event study methodologies. Moreover, just a few 
adjustments to the model enhance accuracy to the results significantly. 
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5. Analysis of the results 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical analysis will be presented. The analysis 
undertaken in this paper is by no means exhaustive. It is to be viewed as a fundamental study 
taking up the issue of banking mergers in the Nordic market. Unfortunately, the small data 
sample restrained the opportunities for more thorough investigations. 
First, results for the entire sample will be presented. Secondly, the impact of merger drivers 
on stock announcement effects will be pinpointed. Then finally, pitfalls of the statistical 
method applied will be addressed in order to interpret the achievements correctly. 
5.1 Results for the entire sample 
The objective of the analysis of the entire sample was to be able to draw a conclusion 
whether the Nordic financial institutions market follows hubris, synergies or a combined 
merger pattern. Therefore, the entire sample encompasses bidder as well as target returns of 
all 28 mergers included in the sample. 
t-Test: One-Sample Entire Sample 
   
  Entire Sample 
Mean 0.117719519 
Variance 0.050130373 
Observations 56 
Hypothesized Mean 0 
df 55 
t Stat 3.899234514 
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.33623E-05 
t Critical two-tail 2.575829304 
Table 2: Entire Sample 
Table 2 lists the results of the one-sample t-test assuming a null hypothesis with a zero mean 
for bidders and targets combined. The result shows a mean of 11.77%. This mean is 
equivalent to the average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) of the entire sample. The p-
value is about 0.0000833, which is much lower than the significance level α =0.01. Thus, 
the null hypothesis 
H0: CAAR(T1,T2) = 0 
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can be rejected reliably. This leads to the conclusion that bank mergers in the Nordic market 
give a significant positive CAAR. 
This finding is not exhaustive in order to determine the basic merger strategy in the Nordic 
financial services industry. A closer look at the distribution of the returns between bidders 
and targets is necessary. 
t-Test: One-Sample Bidder vs. Target 
   
  Bidder Targets 
Mean 0.000195367 0.235243671 
Variance 0.003817225 0.069653243 
Observations 28 28 
Hypothesized Mean 0 0 
df 27 27 
t Stat 0.016430838 4.631579885 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.986650142 2.39854E-06 
t Critical two-tail 2.575829304 2.575829304 
Table 3: Bidder vs. Target (One- Sampled) 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Bidder vs. Target 
   
  Bidder Targets 
Mean 0.000195367 0.235243671 
Variance 0.003817225 0.069653243 
Observations 28 28 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 30  
t Stat -4.588595059  
P(T<=t) one-tail 3.71232E-05  
t Critical one-tail 2.457261531  
P(T<=t) two-tail 7.42464E-05  
t Critical two-tail 2.749995652   
Table 4: Bidder vs. Target (Two-Sampled) 
Table 3 and 4 show the results for the one- and two-sample t-test for the bidder and target 
group respectively. 
The bidders have a CAAR of about 0.02%. The very high p-value (p = 0.98665014) of the 
one-sample test reveals that the null hypothesis can not be rejected neither on a 1%-, 5%- 
nor 10%-significance level. Thus, every “extreme deviation” from the mean in the data 
sample must be interpreted as coincidental. This means that bidders experience neither a 
negative nor a positive CAAR.  
 44 
In contrast, the targets experience a CAAR of 23.52%. This is a mean significantly different 
from zero on all significance levels. As a consequence, the null hypothesis of a hypothesized 
zero sample mean can be rejected with high reliability. The very low p-value of 0.00000239 
confirms this. 
Finally, the two-sample t-test intends to give the statement more credibility. The two-sample 
t-test measures the sample means’ difference. The null hypothesis expects a zero sample 
mean difference. The result of this significance test supports the other findings as the p-
values of both the one-tail and two-tail test are very low (p<<α ). This leads to rejection of 
the null hypothesis. Targets and bidders have significantly20 different sample means with 
bidders’ sample mean being zero and targets’ one being positive. 
To summarise, bidders and targets combined experience a significant merger gain. This 
merger gain is distributed unevenly between the groups. While targets experience a 
significant positive CAAR, bidders end up with CAAR equal to zero. Yet, bidders do not 
experience significant losses from the merger activities either. 
Recalling the hypotheses of Becher about merger reasons, non-negative excess returns to 
bidders combined with positive CAARs to the target and the combined entity supports the 
synergy hypothesis. Thus, the empirical analysis undertaken in this paper finds empirically 
significant justification to merger activity in the Nordic region. As such, it confirms the 
findings of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) who find the same results for a European 
sample. Moreover, this finding confirms the assumption of previous studies of deviating 
stock announcement effects between US and European samples.  
The congruence between the European results and the Nordic ones might confirm the 
statement that the universal banking structure characterises Europe made by Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia (2000). Whether this or other aspects play a role in the European banking M&A 
success will be elaborated on in the next sections. 
                                                 
20 Significantly different on a 1%-, 5%- and 10% significance level 
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5.2 Results of Merger Drivers 
This section presents and interprets the results obtained by the investigation of the different 
merger drivers. The intention is to point out possible different announcement effects to 
certain merger constellations. Specifically, the merger effect of cross product vs. focused, 
international vs. domestic and cash vs. shares payment shall be controlled for.  
The methodology underlying this section is equivalent to the approach used in the previous 
one. First, CAAR for each merger driver is calculated. Thereafter, significance is measured 
by means of one- and two-sample t-tests. 
In this section, the results are not separated into bidder and target returns. The results show 
whether combined firms reach positive average cumulated abnormal returns adjusted for the 
particular merger driver. This is due to the small sample size and, accordingly, difficulties to 
obtain significant results. 
5.2.1 Cross product vs. Focused Deals 
As discussed in chapter 2.4, the effect of cross product mergers is dubious. Some researches 
indicate potential for economies of scope or scale while others do not. The stock 
announcement effect analysis undertaken in this paper is somewhat limited in finding scale 
economies. Stock market reactions to announcements measure expectations of investors. 
Hence, it does not measure the potential for scale economies reliably. However, it does give 
an impression whether capital markets believe in the success of cross product mergers. A 
positive cross product announcement effect is thus interpreted as investors sensing potential 
for economies.  
t-Test: One-Sample Cross product vs. Focused Deals
   
  Cross product Intra-sector 
Mean 0.122097437 0.114436080 
Variance 0.067312712 0.038973328 
Observations 24 32 
Hypothesized Mean 0 0 
df 23 31 
t Stat 2.256949916 3.227454118 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.021139033 0.001041400 
t Critical two-tail 2.575829304 2.575829304 
Table 5: One-Sample Cross product vs. Focused 
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The critical t-value stated in the one-sample t-test in Table 5 is calculated for a significance 
level of α =0.01. The t-value for cross product deals does not exceed the critical value, in 
which case the null hypothesis can not be rejected. This leads to the conclusion that 
diversifying mergers do not have an overall success significantly different from zero given a 
99%-confidence interval. However, cross product deals reveal significance for a 95%-
confidence interval, which is often used as a measure for significance in scientific papers. In 
contrast, intra-sector mergers have significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns as the 
t-value exceeds the critical value also on a 99%-confidence interval. 
The insignificance for the cross product examination is an indication for that CAAR in the 
case of cross product mergers might be zero. This would mean that the capital market does 
not perceive diversifying mergers as profitable, whereas intra-sector mergers seem to be 
more beneficial and create value to mergers. This finding would strongly contradict the 
argument that universal banking creates synergy effects.  
On the other hand, one has to consider that the sample is significant on the 95%-confidence 
interval. The small sample size might be a statistical explanation for the insignificance of the 
cross product mergers’ one-sample t-test. The small sample size entails a high variance, 
which, in turn, causes a low t-value.21
t-Test: Two-Sample Cross product vs. Focused Deals 
   
  Cross product Intra-sectional 
Mean 0.122097437 0.11443608 
Variance 0.067312712 0.038973328 
Observations 24 32 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Df 42  
t Stat 0.12079572  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.452214445  
t Critical one-tail 2.418470354  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.904428889  
t Critical two-tail 2.69806618   
Table 6: Two-Sample Cross product vs. Focused 
The two-sample t-test in table 6 shall shed further light on the results found in the one-
sample test. Given an apparent difference between cross product and focused deals in the 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed discussion of the sample size see chapter 5.3.1 
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one-sample t-test, it is interesting to measure whether the sample means are deviating from 
each other.  
The results in this test are unambiguous. The p-value of the t-statistic is so high that the null 
hypothesis can not be rejected for none of the significance levels of the analysis. Moreover, 
the t-value misses the critical value clearly. Thus, evidence shows that the sample means are 
insignificant and, consequently, have to be assumed to be equal. 
The strong support for equal sample means makes it possible to draw the conclusion that 
investors seem to have as much faith in a cross product merger as they have on a focused 
one. This can be inferred from the fact that focused mergers have lower abnormal returns 
(11.44% vs. 12.27%). Hence, the question whether a merger is focused or not does not seem 
to play a major role in investor’s perspective of a Nordic merger. 
This finding contradicts the universal banking argument often discussed in relation with 
mergers. At least investors perceive potential synergy gains from cross product mergers as 
being not higher than focused ones. This might be due to a high number of small banks in 
the Nordic sample, which can improve efficiency by acquiring other banks through cost 
reductions and increase market concentration (Berger et al., 1999). The capital market 
perceives such mergers as profitable. 
After all, the impact of the focus of merger seems to be overestimated in other research 
effort in this field. The announcement effect study for the Nordic market does not provide 
support for benefits of universal banking.  
5.2.2 Domestic vs. International 
The results obtained above do not allow for drawing final conclusions about the success of 
cross product mergers. Thus, there must be other variables influencing success or failure of 
banking M&As in the Nordic market. 
The next variable, which has been examined in this study, is the geographical or regional 
focus of the merger. This is whether domestic or cross-national mergers are more successful. 
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t-Test: One-Sample Domestic vs. International 
   
  Domestic International 
Mean 0.158742594 0.091175176 
Variance 0.066852407 0.039160298 
Observations 22 34 
Hypothesized 
Mean 0 0 
df 21 33 
t Stat 2.813484949 2.646735759 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003980618 0.007219662 
t Critical two-tail 2.575829304 2.575829304 
Table 7: One-Sample Domestic vs. International 
The one-sample t-tests provides positive CAAR for both the domestic and international 
merger sample, meaning that both experience abnormal returns significantly different from 
zero on a 99%-confidence interval. It is striking though that the domestic M&A have a 
higher mean than international ones. Hence, domestic mergers have higher abnormal returns 
than international ones (15.87% vs. 9.12%). Thus, a two-sample t-test helps to figure out 
whether the difference is significant. 
t-Test: Two-Sample Domestic vs. International 
   
  Domestic International 
Mean 0.158742594 0.091175176 
Variance 0.066852407 0.039160298 
Observations 22 34 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Df 37  
t Stat 1.043766623  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.151682613  
t Critical one-tail 2.431447397  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.303365225  
t Critical two-tail 2.715408718   
Table 8: Two-Sample Domestic vs. International 
The t-value is about 1.04, which is lower than the critical value of 2.72. The null hypothesis 
can not be rejected. In economical terms, this means that the difference between the samples 
means of domestic and international mergers is zero and that contingent deviations are 
purely coincidental. 
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However, the p-value is at about 0.15 for this data sample. Even though the result is 
insignificant from a scientific point of view22, a difference can be observed compared to the 
p-value of the cross product vs. intra-section data sample where the p-value was about 0.45. 
This means that the probability to receive an extreme result given that the null hypothesis 
holds is much higher in this data sample. An extreme value in the one-tail t-test would be a 
significantly higher abnormal return to a domestic merger than to an international one. Given 
the relatively low p-value, it is possible that a bigger sample size would lead to a significant 
result.  
The means of the two mergers and the positive t-value of the two-sample t-test indicate that 
the probability of international mergers being more profitable than domestic ones can be 
excluded with high certainty. Thus, geographic expansion as the exclusive reason for 
international merger activity is not sufficient to justify such deals.  
This is an interesting finding considering the theoretical discussion in chapter 2.5. 
Internalisation theory stated that if total benefits of internalisation processes exceed total 
information costs, international mergers are more successful than domestic ones. In the 
Nordic sample of banking mergers, information costs seem high enough to outweigh benefits 
from internalisation.  
Information costs comprised the costs created from cultural and geographical dissimilarity. 
In spite of the cultural assimilation between Nordic countries, investors do not seem to 
perceive international mergers more favourable than domestic ones. International mergers in 
this study do generate positive abnormal returns. However, Buch and De Long (2004) 
proved that high information costs reduce merger incentives. Consequently, performance of 
mergers, in which cultures that are more unequal are involved, might be worse. Then, it 
becomes more doubtful whether international mergers are profitable at all. 
 
                                                 
22 For a more detailed discussion on statistical significance see chapter 5.3.2 
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5.2.3 Medium of Payment 
Finally, the impact of the medium of payment on announcement effects is determined. 
t-Test: One-Sample Method of Payment 
   
  Cash Shares 
Mean 0.122845603 0.183283665 
Variance 0.049821327 0.065726443 
Observations 28 14 
Hypothesized Mean 0 0 
df 27 13 
t Stat 2.859788074 2.577658458 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003588174 0.007473759 
t Critical two-tail 2.575829304 2.575829304 
Table 9: One-Sample Method of Payment 
Based on the overall success of M&As in the Nordic market, it is unsurprising that both cash 
and share payments generate significant, positive CAARs on a 90%-, 95%- and 99%-
confidence interval even though the t-value just exceeds the critical value for share payments 
atα =0.01. However, the mean of deals with share payment is higher than the mean for cash 
paid mergers. Recalling the weight of research on asymmetric information theory, this 
finding is not necessarily expected. A two-sample t-test provides further detail on whether 
the means are significantly different from each other.  
t-Test: Two-Sample Method of Payment 
   
  Cash Shares 
Mean 0.122845603 0.183283665 
Variance 0.049821327 0.065726443 
Observations 28 14 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Df 23  
t Stat -0.751141121  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.230092383  
t Critical one-tail 2.499866736  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.460184767  
t Critical two-tail 2.807335678   
Table 10: Two-Sample Method of Payment 
As can be seen in Table 10, the null hypothesis that the samples’ means are equal can not be 
rejected as the p-value is higher than 0.10. Hence, deviations have to be assumed to be by 
chance. No clear pattern can be determined based on the results of this analysis, meaning 
that CAARs of cash-paid and shares-paid deals have to be assumed equal.  
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Yet, the negative t-value allows for an inference that abnormal return on shares-paid deals is 
at the least not lower. This means that either asymmetric information theory can be 
discarded as empirically irrelevant or that there is an effect balancing asymmetric 
information. Given the latter case, the tax-effect seems to outweigh asymmetric information 
of the entities’ management. Research in this paper does not provide information on the 
validity of the theories and, therefore, does not allow for a conclusion about the impact of 
the respective theories presented in chapter 2.6. 
5.3 Remarks on the Empirical Results 
The results in section 5.2 are similar out of one perspective. None of the two-sample t-tests 
undertaken provides statistically significant results. Nonetheless, cautious statements about 
the behaviour of the data sample were made. This section provides justification for the 
statements made in spite of the insignificant empirical results. 
First, the limitation of the statistical method used will be presented. This creates awareness 
of the methodological difficulties underlying the study in this paper. Subsequently, a 
justification for the statements made will be derived. 
5.3.1 Power of the Tests 
Crucial to validity of t-tests is the actual power of the test. Power in hypothesis testing is 
defined as the “ability to detect the presence of a nonzero abnormal return” (Campbell et al.; 
1997; 168). In other words, it is “the probability of correctly rejecting H0 when H1 is true” 
(Ruppert, 2004; 64). Campbell et al. (1997) mention that difficulties exist when one tries to 
measure reliably the power of a test.  Appendix 3 shows an example of the power given 
standard deviations of σ =2% and σ =4% for different samples. As can be seen in appendix 
3, the probability of detecting abnormal returns is increasing the bigger abnormal returns 
become. In order to detect low abnormal returns reliably, big sample sizes and low variances 
are needed. 
Variances in the data sample of this paper are remarkably higher than in appendix 3. At the 
same time, sample sizes in the investigation of the merger drivers are varying between 14 
and 34. Appendix 3 shows for σ =4% and sample size of 14 a 15% chance to correctly 
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detect an abnormal return of 1%. Considering higher variance, the probability becomes even 
lower.  
If an estimation of the power finds insufficient results, the power of the test can be enhanced. 
“This can be done by a bigger sample size, shortening the event window or by developing 
more specific predictions of the null hypothesis” (Campbell et al., 1997; 172). The most 
common way is to increase sample size. 
A bigger sample size in all of the examined subgroups would have a two-sided effect. At the 
one hand, the direct influence of sample size on power and on the other hand, with a big 
enough sample size, it would be possible to look at bidders and targets in all subgroups 
separately. This would enhance the statistical and economical opportunities of this study. 
Thus, a bigger data sample in this study might potentially increase significance of the results 
and, ultimately, enhance credibility of the study.                                                                                                  
5.3.2 Statistical vs. Practical Significance 
In chapter 5.2, several inferences were made from the data sample underlying the study. 
These inferences were made in spite of the rather low power of the tests. In the following, it 
will be highlighted how conclusions can be drawn on insignificant results. 
Ruppert (2004) distinguishes the terms statistical and practical significance. If a null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a given significance level, the result is statistically significant. 
Statistical significance sheds light on whether the differences occurring in the study are 
attributable to chance or not. Significance as it is used in this paper refers to statistical 
significance. 
However, Ruppert (2004) criticises the sole focus on statistical significance as it does not 
evaluate the practical importance of a statistical finding. This means that hypothesis testing 
might lead to statistical significance, but has no practical impact as the effect is too small. In 
contrast, some issues might have a meaning in practise even though statistical significance 
can not be reached in the hypothesis testing. This means that a mean difference between 
9.12% and 15.87% might be of interest although the sample is statistically insignificant. 
Ruppert (2004; 65) argues that a subject matter expert has to decide on “how large is large 
enough” for a result to be of practical significance. The inferences made in this paper are 
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perceived as “large enough” by the author. Apparently, these are based on practical 
significance, meaning that making the statement is worthwhile to practitioners. Potential 
criticism from the scientific world is therefore hazarded. 
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6. Summary and Outlook 
In this paper, merger announcement effects of stocks in the Nordic market were studied. The 
sample consisted of 28 Nordic mergers in the period from 1999-2006. Below, the results are 
summarised and reviewed non-technically. The results are compared to the results of 
previous research in the field. Finally, this chapter tries to give an outlook on future research 
areas of Nordic bank merger announcements. 
6.1 Summary of the Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis in this paper was divided into two parts. The first part focused on 
whether Nordic financial services industry M&As provide merger gains to bidders, targets 
and the combined entity. The research was undertaken in order to be able to test the results 
of the European bank merger study by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000). 
In the event study of this paper, a positive cumulative abnormal return is found for the 
targets and the combined entity. At the same time, bidders achieve a merger gain not 
significantly deviating from zero. In other words, merger gains to bidders are non-negative. 
Thus, it can be argued with certainty that Nordic financial institutions M&As follow the 
synergy hypothesis, meaning that the involved parties create value by merging the two 
entities. 
This finding verifies the evidence from Cybo-Ottone and Murgia who find the same result 
for a sample of 14 European bank mergers and, thereby, reinforces the assumption that there 
are different conditions for bank M&As between the US and Europe. 
The second part of the analysis dealt with the drivers for merger activity. Three disputed 
drivers were investigated: cross product vs. focused, international vs. domestic and the 
medium of payment. The examination of cross product vs. focused deals does not provide 
conclusive results whether there is an advantage from diversifying business activity. In 
contrast to focused deals, cross product deals are statistically not different to zero. However, 
when testing mean differences, the null hypothesis assuming equal means can not be 
rejected. Other empirical research finds activity-focused mergers most value enhancing 
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(Boot, 2003). The findings in this paper indicate that value gains of focused and diversifying 
mergers are almost equal. Therefore, the choice of a merger’s activity focus is not the most 
crucial issue. 
Secondly, the geographical focus of bank M&A was tested. Results show a tendency 
towards domestic mergers being more profitable even though the mean-difference test does 
not allow for a rejection of the null hypothesis. However, it seems rather clear that 
international mergers are not more successful than domestic ones. Following Berger et al. 
(2001), this shows that efficiency barriers of international mergers are big even in the Nordic 
market, in which language and culture are similar. Thus, the results may predict problems 
with lower cultural assimilation. 
The last variable evaluated is the medium of payment in M&As. The sample means are in 
favour of shares payment. Again, the mean-difference test is insignificant. As such, it is 
impossible to draw a conclusion. However, the result is somewhat surprising, as most 
research seems to put more weight on asymmetric information theory when discussing cash 
vs. shares payment. Following asymmetric information theory, cash payment would be 
expected to be more beneficial. This result contradicts prior research (De Long, 2003), 
which finds cash payments slightly more profitable. However, De Long (2003) also obtains 
insignificant results. 
The insignificant results of the merger driver analysis limit the scientific reliability of this 
study. Insignificance is most probably caused by the small data sample. This fact is also 
mirrored in the low power of the test and opens up for follow up research on M&As in the 
Nordic financial market. An attempt to provide an outlook on future research in the field is 
made in the next section. 
6.2 Future Research 
As mentioned earlier, there has been little research on stock announcement effects on Nordic 
financial services M&As. It is therefore essential to recall that the research undertaken in 
this paper intended to initiate a discussion in this field. As such, it is to be seen as 
introductory and by no means exhaustive. 
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The problem of gathering data is due to few listed financial institutions in the Nordic market 
(Vander Vennet, 1998). This was an issue research in this paper struggled with. The 
Scandinavian banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s did not allow for a data sample 
including deals, which took place in the middle of the crisis or were directly affected by it. 
This is because market values and stock announcement effects of financial institutions may 
not be usefully representative as a result of the crisis.  
In the future, it will probably be possible to collect a bigger data sample as market 
consolidation and structural changes in the European financial services industry are likely to 
continue internationally (Øverli, 2003). The ongoing consolidation will affect the Nordic 
banking market too. DnB Nor’s decision in 2005 to define Sweden as part of the company’s 
home market reflects this.23  
A bigger sample will ultimately increase the power of the test and, thus, make it easier to 
derive significant results. In addition, a bigger sample allows for a separated examination of 
the drivers for the bidders and targets. 
Another issue is the choice of the merger drivers measured. In this paper, information on the 
mergers enabled the measuring of the above-mentioned drivers. Beitel et al. (2004) examine 
a more comprehensive list of merger drivers. Examples include the relative asset size of the 
target in relation to a bidder, profit efficiency, etc. Accordingly, a study of the Nordic market 
could incorporate other drivers. 
Finally, event study methodology fails to measure whether synergies could be exploited 
successfully ex post. In order to execute a more holistic analysis of Nordic financial 
institutions M&As, performance studies and dynamic efficiency studies are indispensable. 
 
  
 
                                                 
23 See the company’s annual report in 2006 
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Appendix 1 
Complete list of M&As retrieved from the Zephyr database: 
Acquirer Country Target Country 
BG Bank DK Realkredit Danmark DK 
Storebrand ASA NO Finansbanken ASA NO 
FöreningsSparbanken AB SE Hansapank AS EE 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SE Bergensbanken ASA NO 
Islandsbanki HF IS FBA IS 
Merita Nordbanken Group SE Nordea DK 
SEB AB SE Eesti Ühispank AS EE 
Merita Nordbanken Group SE Christiania Bank/Kreditkasse NO 
Spar Nord Bank A/S DK Aars Bank AS DK 
SEB AB SE Latvijas Unibanka AS LV 
SEB AB SE Vilniaus Bankas LT 
SEB AB SE Eesti Ühispank AS EE 
FöreningsSparbanken AB SE Hansapank AS EE 
Danske Bank A/S DK RealDanmark A/S DK 
Kaupthing Investment Bank IS Frjalsi Fjarfestigarbankinn HF IS 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SE Midtbank A/S DK 
Egnsbank Han Herred A/S DK DAI Holding A/S DK 
Nordea DK Nordea Bank Polska SA PL 
SEB AB SE Eesti Ühispank AS EE 
Sydbank A/S DK Egnsbank Fyn AS DK 
Ringkjøbing Landbobank DK Tarm Bank A/S DK 
Sampo Oyi FI Sampo Bank AS EE 
Kaupthing Bank HF IS JP Nordiska AB SE 
Sparekassen Faaborg A/S DK Regional Invest Fyn A/S DK 
Islandsbanki HF IS Sjóvá-Almennar tryggingar HF IS 
Nordic Baltic Holding AB SE Bank Komunalnz SA W Gdyni PL 
DnB Holding ASA NO Nordlansbanken ASA NO 
Danske Bank A/S DK Fokus Bank ASA NO 
DnB Holding ASA NO Gjensidige Nor ASA NO 
Kaupthing Bank HF IS Audlind HF IS 
Nordvestbank A/S DK Vestjysk Bank A/S DK 
Islandsbanki HF IS Kredittbanken ASA NO 
Helgeland Sparebank NO Sparebanken Rana NO 
Islandsbanki HF IS Bolig- og Næringsbanken ASA NO 
FöreningsSparbanken AB SE Hansapank AS EE 
Landsbanki Islands HF IS Buróarás HF IS 
OKO FI Pohjola-Yhtymä Oyi FI 
SEB AB SE Privatbanken ASA NO 
DnB NOR Bank ASA NO Nord/LB Latvija IAS LV 
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Appendix 2 
List with all information of all M&As included in the empirical analysis: 
Acquirer Industry Target Industry Status 
Storebrand ASA 8775/8575 Finansbanken ASA 8355 Completed
FöreningsSparbanken  8355 Hansapank AS 8355 Completed
Svenska  
Handelsbanken  8777/8355 Bergensbanken ASA 8355 Completed
Merita Nordbanken  8355 Nordea/ Unidanmark 8355 Completed
SEB AB 8355 Eesti Ühispank AS 8355 Completed
Merita Nordbanken  8355 Christiania Bank/ Kreditkasse 8355 Completed
Spar Nord Bank A/S 8355 Aars Bank AS 8355 Completed
SEB AB 8355 Latvijas Unibanka AS 8355 Completed
FöreningsSparbanken  8355 Hansapank AS 8355 Completed
Danske Bank A/S 8355/8777 RealDanmark A/S 8355/8779 Completed
Svenska  
Handelsbanken  8777/8355 Midtbank A/S 8355/8777 Completed
Egnsbank Han Herred 8355 DAI Holding A/S 8777 Completed
SEB AB 8355 Eesti Ühispank AS 8355 Completed
Sydbank A/S 8355 Egnsbank Fyn AS 8355 Completed
Ringkjøbing  
Landbobank 8355 Tarm Bank A/S 8355 Completed
Sampo Oyi 8355/8575 Sampo Bank AS 8355 Completed
Kaupthing Bank HF 8777/8355 JP Nordiska AB 8777 Completed
Sparekassen Faaborg  8355 Regional Invest Fyn 8777 Completed
Islandsbanki HF 8355 Sjóvá-Almennar  tryggingar  8575/8536 Completed
DnB Holding ASA 8355 Nordlansbanken ASA 8355 Completed
Danske Bank A/S 8355/8777 Fokus Bank ASA 8355/8777 Completed
DnB Holding ASA 8355 Gjensidige Nor ASA 8355/8777 Pending 
Islandsbanki HF 8355 Kredittbanken ASA 8355 Completed
Helgeland Sparebank 8355 Sparebanken Rana 8355 Completed
Islandsbanki HF 8355 Bolig- og  Næringsbanken 8355 Completed
FöreningsSparbanken 8355 Hansapank AS 8355 Completed
SEB AB 8355 Privatbanken ASA 8355 Completed
DnB NOR Bank ASA 8355/8777 Nord/LB Latvija IAS 8355 Pending 
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Acquirer Target Announced Rumoured Completed 
Storebrand  
ASA Finansbanken ASA 07.01.1999 07.01.1999 12.02.1999 
Förenings 
Sparbanken AB Hansapank AS 20.10.1999 20.10.1999 20.10.1999 
Svenska  
Handelsbanken  Bergensbanken ASA 03.05.1999 03.05.1999 19.01.2000 
Merita  
Nordbanken Group Nordea/Unidanmark 06.03.2000 06.03.2000 29.06.2000 
SEB AB Eesti  Ühispank AS 28.08.2000 28.08.2000 20.10.2000 
Merita  
Nordbanken Group 
Christiania Bank/ 
Kreditkasse 16.10.2000 16.10.2000 03.11.2000 
Spar Nord  
Bank A/S Aars Bank AS 15.11.2000 15.11.2000 15.11.2000 
SEB AB Latvijas  Unibanka AS 20.11.2000 20.11.2000 20.11.2000 
Förenings 
Sparbanken AB Hansapank AS 29.12.2000 29.12.2000 29.12.2000 
Danske  
Bank A/S RealDanmark A/S 02.10.2000 02.10.2000 28.03.2001 
Svenska  
Handelsbanken Midtbank A/S 11.04.2001 11.04.2001 17.05.2001 
Egnsbank  
Han Herred A/S DAI Holding A/S 22.06.2001 22.06.2001 22.06.2001 
SEB AB Eesti  Ühispank AS 27.02.2002 27.02.2002 27.02.2002 
Sydbank A/S Egnsbank  Fyn AS 18.02.2002 18.02.2002 13.05.2002 
Ringkjøbing  
Landbobank Tarm Bank A/S 27.06.2002 27.06.2002 27.06.2002 
Sampo Oyi Sampo Bank  AS 17.06.2002 15.05.2002 02.08.2002 
Kaupthing  
Bank HF JP Nordiska AB 29.08.2002 29.08.2002 17.02.2003 
Sparekassen  
Faaborg A/S 
Regional Invest  
Fyn A/S 01.11.2002 01.11.2002 01.04.2003 
Islandsbanki HF Sjóvá-Almennar  tryggingar 28.10.2003 22.09.2003 31.10.2003 
DnB Holding ASA Nordlansbanken  ASA 20.12.2002 16.12.2002 14.03.2003 
Danske Bank A/S Fokus Bank  ASA 07.05.1999 07.05.1999 30.06.1999 
DnB Holding ASA Gjensidige Nor  ASA 18.03.2003 01.07.2002 31.12.2003 
Islandsbanki  
HF Kredittbanken ASA 10.09.2004 12.08.2004 04.01.2005 
Helgeland  
Sparebank Sparebanken Rana 03.11.2004 03.11.2004 08.04.2005 
Islandsbanki HF Bolig- og  Næringsbanken 29.11.2004 07.03.2001 09.05.2005 
Förenings 
Sparbanken AB Hansapank AS 22.03.2005 11.02.2005 01.07.2005 
SEB AB Privatbanken  ASA 25.04.2005 21.04.2005 08.11.2005 
DnB NOR Bank ASA Nord/LB Latvija  IAS 16.01.2006 10.01.2006 Outstanding 
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Acquirer Target Payment Bid premium 
Storebrand  
ASA Finansbanken ASA Cash No information 
Förenings 
Sparbanken  Hansapank AS No information No information 
Svenska  
Handelsbanken  Bergensbanken ASA No information No information 
Merita  
Nordbanken Group Nordea/Unidanmark Shares 15% on 03.03.2000 
SEB AB Eesti  Ühispank AS Cash 41% on 25.08.2000 
Merita  
Nordbanken Group 
Christiania Bank/ 
Kreditkasse Cash 44% on 17.09.1999 
Spar Nord  
Bank A/S Aars Bank AS Cash 67% on 14.11.2000 
SEB AB Latvijas  Unibanka AS Cash Increased offer 25.10. 
Förenings 
Sparbanken AB Hansapank AS No information No information 
Danske  
Bank A/S RealDanmark A/S Shares 71% on 29.09.2000 
Svenska  
Handelsbanken AB Midtbank A/S Cash 151% on 10.04.2001 
Egnsbank  
Han Herred A/S DAI Holding A/S Cash 21% on 21.06.2001 
SEB  
AB Eesti Ühispank AS Cash No information 
Sydbank A/S Egnsbank  Fyn AS Shares 65% on 15.02.2002 
Ringkjøbing  
Landbobank Tarm Bank A/S Shares 67% on 26.06.2002 
Sampo Oyi Sampo  Bank AS Cash 5% on 14.05.2002 
Kaupthing  
Bank HF JP Nordiska AB Shares 41% on 28.08.2002 
Sparekassen  
Faaborg A/S 
Regional Invest  
Fyn A/S No information 5% on 31.10.2002 
Islandsbanki HF Sjóvá-Almennar  tryggingar No information No information 
DnB Holding ASA Nordlansbanken  ASA Cash 21% on 19.12.2002 
Danske Bank  
A/S Fokus Bank ASA No information No information 
DnB Holding  
ASA Gjensidige Nor ASA Shares -17% on 28.06.2002 
Islandsbanki HF Kredittbanken  ASA Cash 32% on 11.08.2004 
Helgeland  
Sparebank Sparebanken Rana Shares No information 
Islandsbanki HF Bolig- og  Næringsbanken Cash 26% on 12.11.2004 
Förenings 
Sparbanken AB Hansapank AS Cash 28% on 10.02.2005 
SEB  
AB Privatbanken ASA Cash 16% on 20.04.2005 
DnB NOR Bank ASA Nord/LB Latvija  IAS No information -28% on 09.01.2006 
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Appendix 3 
Table of power of event study methodology 
 
Figure 5: MacKinlay (1997); Power of event study methodology 
 
  
 
